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...the manner in which [auto insurance] premiums are computed and paid fails miserably
to bring home to the automobile user the costs he imposes in a manner that will appropriately
inﬂuence his decisions.
— William Vickrey
Americans drive 2,360,000,000,000 miles each year, and the cost of auto accidents is
commensurately large:1 roughly $100 billion in accident insurance,2 a n da c c o r d i n gt ot h e
Urban Institute [1991] an additional $250 billion in uninsured accident costs per year.
Every time a driver takes to the road, and with each mile she drives, she exposes herself
and others to the risk of accident. (The degree of risk depends, of course, upon a wide variety
of factors such as a driver’s skill or age, and the territory she drives in.) Yet, most auto
insurance premiums have largely lump-sum characteristics and are only weakly linked to
mileage. Mileage classiﬁcations are coarse, and low-mileage discounts are extremely modest
and based on self-reported estimates of future mileage that have no implicit or explicit
commitment.3 (Two noteworthy exceptions are premiums on some commercial policies4
and a few recent pilot programs.)5 Few drivers therefore pay or perceive a signiﬁcant
1See table No. 1030, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1997, U.S. Department of Commerce.
Figure for 1994.
2After subtracting comprehensive insurance coverage, which covers ﬁre, theft, vandalism and other in-
cidents unrelated to the amount of driving, the remaining premiums for private passenger vehicles totaled
$84 billion in 1995. State Average Expenditures and Premiums for Personal Automobile Insurance in 1995,
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Jan. 1997. In additon, commercial premiums are approx-
imately 15 percent of premiums for private passenger vehicles. The Insurance Information Institute 1998
Fact Book, p. 22.
3For example, State Farm distinguishes drivers based upon whether they report an estimated annual
mileage of under or over 7500 miles. Drivers who estimate annual mileages of under 7500 miles receive 15%
discounts (5% in Massachusetts). The 15% discount is modest given that those who drive less than 7500
miles per year drive an average of 3600 miles compared to 13,000 miles for those who drive over 7500 per
year, according to the 1994 Residential Transportation Energy Consumption Survey of the Department of
Energy. The implied elasticity of accident costs with respect to miles is .05,a no r d e ro fm a g n i t u d eb e l o w
what the evidence suggests is the private or social elasticity of accident costs. The link between driving and
premiums may be attenuated in part because there is signiﬁcant noise in self-reported estimates of future
mileage, estimates whose accuracy does not aﬀect insurance pay-outs.
Insurance companies also classify based upon the distance of a commute to work. These categories are also
coarse, however. State Farm, for example, classiﬁes cars based upon whether they are used for commuting
less than 20 miles per week, in between 20 and 100 miles per week, or over 100 miles per week.
4For private and public livery, taxicabs, and buses, because “rates are high and because there is no risk
when the car is not in operation, a system of rating has been devised on an earnings basis per $100 of gross
receipts or on a mileage basis.” Bickelhaupt [1983, p. 613]. For details on per-mile commercial insurance, see
“Commercial Automobile Supplementary Rating Procedures,” Insurance Services Oﬃce, on ﬁle with author.
5O n ee x p e r i m e n ti si nT e x a sa n da n o t h e ri nt h eU K .S e e“ I n s u r a n c eb yt h eM i l e ,”W a l lS t r e e tJ o u r -2
insurance cost from driving an extra mile, despite the substantial accident costs involved.
An ideal tort and insurance system would charge each driver the full social cost of her
particular risk exposure on the marginal mile of driving. Otherwise, people will drive too
much and cause too many accidents (from the vantage of economic eﬃciency).
In principle, insurance companies could levy a substantial charge for driving an extra
mile, as new car leases do; however, this would require them to incur the cost of verifying
mileage (through periodic odometer checks or by installing a monitoring and broadcasting
device in vehicles).6 A central point of this paper is that externalities make their incentives
to do so considerably less than the social incentives. If insurance company C is able to reduce
the driving of its insureds, although it will save on accident payouts, substantial “external”
savings will be realized by other insurance carriers and their insureds who will get into
fewer accidents with C’s insureds. These externalities follow from Vickrey’s observation
that if two drivers get into an accident, even the safer driver is typically a “but for” cause
of the accident in the sense that had she opted for the metro, the accident would not
have occurred.7 Externalities help explain why we are only just now seeing pilot per-mile
premiums programs.
Accident externalities suggest a valuable role for policy, and this paper investigates the
nal (1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english business/newsid-1831000/1831181.stm, http://www.norwich-
union.co.uk. Progressive Corporation has a pilot program in Texas in which miles (and locations) are
monitored by a device using cellular-phone and satellite technology. Since January 2002 it is now legal
for auto insurance policies in Texas to have the unit of exposure be the vehicle-mile rather than the more
traditional vehicle-year.
6In practice there may be a regulatory constraint that has discouraged ﬁrms from per-mile pricing. The
traditional unit of risk insurance that insurance companies price is the vehicle-year. Just recently after
a lobbying campaign by the National Organization for Women, Texas adopted legislation allowing ﬁrms
to adopt the vehicle-mile as the unit of exposure. (http://www.centspermilenow.org). Long before this,
however, ﬁrms charged slight surcharges based upon unaudited reports of high usage. Obviously, there is a
fuzzy line here because as such charges become more reﬁned and audits of usage are performed, the vehicle-
year exposure unit slips into a vehicle-mile unit. Firms have not generally pushed that direction, however,
so it is unclear whether there has been a meaningful regulatory constraint.
7Sometimes, of course, only one driver is the cause of an accident, even when the accident involves
multiple cars such as when a driver plows into a long line of cars. If one car wasn’t there to absorb the
impact, another would have, so the cars that are hit do not cause the accident in any respect. Such accident
substitution is not accounted for by the theoretical model we present, and reduces the externalities from
driving. This substitution eﬀect is, however, accounted for by our regression results.3
potential beneﬁts of two proposals that would increase the marginal charge for driving,
and consequently reduce driving and accidents. The ﬁrst proposal is per-mile premiums,
advocated by Litman [1997], Butler [1990], and the National Organization for Women [1998].
Under a per-mile premium system, the basic unit of exposure would shift from the car-
year to the car-mile, either by requirement or by subtler policy tools, so that the total
premiums of driver i would be mipi,w h e r emi is the miles i travels and pi is the per-mile
rate. An individual’s per-mile rate, pi, would vary among drivers to reﬂect the per-mile
risk of a given driver and could depend upon territory, driver age, safety records or other
relevant characteristics used today for per-year rates. (In fact, the technology now used
experimentally by Progressive in Texas also allows prices to vary by time of the day and
by location.)8 The second proposal is to couple per-mile premiums with a Pigouvian tax
in order to account for the “Vickrey” accident externality. Both these proposals diﬀer
fundamentally from the uniform per-gallon gas tax proposals of Vickrey [1968],9 Sugarman
[1993], and Tobias [1993], because under gas tax proposals, unlike per-mile premiums, the
additional cost of driving would be independent of driver age, driver safety records, or in
some cases of territory (all highly important indicia of risk), yet would depend upon fuel
eﬃciency ( a relatively poor risk measure).
This paper makes several contributions. We begin by developing a simple model from
primitives that relates miles driven to accidents, formalizing Vickrey’s insights about the
externalities of driving — this contribution is mainly pedagogical. Our second contribution is
to provide evidence that these externalities are substantial. Our third is to provide the ﬁrst
estimates of the potential beneﬁts of per-mile premiums that take into account Vickrey’s
externalities as well as the resulting fact that as driving falls, so too will accident rates and
8See Wall Street Journal [1999].
9Actually, Vickrey’s ﬁrst suggestion was that auto insurance be bundled with tires hoping that the wear
on a tire would be roughly proportional to the amount it is driven. He worried about moral hazard (using
a tire until it was threadbare), but concluded that this problem would be limited if refunds were issued in
proportion to the amount of tread remaining.4
per-mile premiums. 10 Our fourth contribution is to estimate the beneﬁts of a per-mile
premium policy coupled with a Pigouvian tax. (It’s natural to consider taxing per-mile
premiums to account for accident externalities once one incorporates externalities.) Finally
our estimates incorporate lower bound estimates of congestion cost reductions. These
estimates are a rough ﬁrst cut and should be viewed as lower bounds for reasons we will
elaborate.
Our evidence that accident externalities are signiﬁcant in practice is that states with
more traﬃc density have considerably higher insurance costs per mile driven. This suggests
that the more people drive on the same roads, the more dangerous driving becomes. (A
little introspection will probably convince most readers that crowded roadways are more
dangerous than open ones. In heavy traﬃc, most us feel compelled to a constant vigilance to
avoid the numerous moving hazards.)11 Nationally, the insured cost of accidents is roughly
4 cents per-mile driven, but we estimate that the marginal cost — the cost if an extra mile is
driven — is much higher, roughly 7 and a half cents, because of these accident externalities.
In high traﬃc-density states like New Jersey, Hawaii, or Rhode Island, we estimate that the
marginal cost is roughly 15 cents. For comparison, gasoline costs roughly 6 cents per mile,
so an eﬃcient Pigouvian charge for accidents at the margin would dramatically increase the
marginal cost of driving, and would presumably reduce driving substantially.
Even without a Pigouvian charge to account for accident externalities, a system of
per-mile premiums that shifted a ﬁxed insurance charge to the margin would be roughly
equivalent to a 70% hike in the gasoline price and could be expected to reduce driving
10Externalities turn out to increase the beneﬁt estimates by 85-140%, over what one would calculate in a
linear model of accidents (i.e. a model without externalities) as studied by Litman [1987)] and Rea [1992].
Note that a linear model is appropriate to estimate the gains to a given insurance carrier with small market
s h a r ea n di t sc u s t o m e r sf r o ms w i t c h i n gt op e r - m i l ep r e m i u m sa sR e ad o e s .
11T h i sv i g i l a n c en od o u b tw o r k st oo ﬀset the dangers we perceive but seems unlikely to completely counter
balance them. Note also that the cost of stress and tension that we experience in traﬃc are partly accident
avoidance costs and should properly be included in a full measure of accident externality costs.5
nationally by 9.2% - 9.5%, and insured accident costs by $14 - $17 billion. After subtracting
t h el o s td r i v i n gb e n e ﬁts of $4.3 - $4.4 billion, the net accident reductions would be $9.8 -
$12.7 billion or $58 - $75 per insured vehicle. The net savings would be $10.7 - $15.3 billion
if per-mile premiums were taxed to account for the external eﬀect of one person’s driving
on raising others’ insurance premiums .12
These estimates are probably a lower bound on what savings would actually be under a
per-mile system. The reason is that these estimates use state level data and assume that
drivers and territories are homogeneous within a state. Currently intrastate heterogeneity
i na c c i d e n t r i s k sa n dc o s t si sr e ﬂected in yearly insurance premiums. In a per-mile system,
this heterogeneity would likewise be reﬂected in per-mile rates that vary substantially by
territory, driver age, and driver accident record. Since the most dangerous drivers in the
most dangerous territories would face the steepest rise in marginal driving cost and therefore
reduce driving the most, actual beneﬁts could be considerably larger than our estimates. If
state heterogeneity is a useful guide, territory heterogeneity alone would raise the beneﬁts of
per-mile premiums by 10%. Other types of heterogeneity (such as age) could raise beneﬁts
substantially more.
The main reason insurance companies have not switched to per-mile premiums is prob-
ably that monitoring actual mileage with yearly odometer checks seems too costly given
their potential gains, as suggested by Rea [1992] and Williamson et al. [1967, p. 247].13
However, our analysis suggests that the gains a given insurance company could realize by
switching to per-mile premiums are considerably less than the social gains. A single com-
pany and its customers might stand to gain only $31 per vehicle per year from the switch,
far less than the potential social gains of $58 per insured vehicle that we estimate when we
12These ranges represent point estimates obtained with the regression and calibration methods described
in section 4.
13Monitoring costs are cited as the principal reason by actuaries I have interviewed (see also Nelson [1990]
and Cardoso [1993]).6
include the Vickrey externality (i.e., the reduction in others’ insurance costs.) Moreover,
the $31 in private gains would be temporary from an insurer’s vantage, and would all go
to consumers once other ﬁrms match its new policies. 14 This discrepancy implies that the
social gains from per-mile premiums might justify the monitoring costs (and the ﬁxed costs
of transition), even if no single insurance company could proﬁt from the change itself.
Other external beneﬁts could make the discrepancy between the private gains from per-
mile premiums and the social gains even larger. A great deal of accident costs are uninsured
or underinsured (more than half according to the Urban Institute) and the driving reductions
caused by per-mile premiums should reduce these costs just as they reduce insured accident
costs.15 Policy intervention looks more attractive still when nonaccident beneﬁts such as
congestion are taken into account. Congestion reductions raise our estimates of the beneﬁts
from per-mile premiums by $5.5-$5.7 billion. This brings our estimates of total national
beneﬁts from per-mile premiums to $15.5-$18.2 billion ($18.7-24.7 billion with a Pigouvian
tax), or $91.5-107.5 per insured vehicle ($110.8-146.2 with a Pigouvian tax). Beneﬁts would
be higher still, if pollution costs, road maintenance costs, and other externality costs are
higher than we assume here.16 T h ef a c tt h a ta c c i d e n ta n dc o n g e stion externalities could
make up more than two thirds of the beneﬁts from per-mile premiums suggests that even
if monitoring costs are so large that it is rational for insurance companies to maintain the
current premium structure, it is likely that per-mile premiums could still enhance eﬃciency
in many states. Likewise, it suggests that as mileage monitoring technology becomes cheaper
(e.g., cellular phone and global positioning system technology), insurance companies may
be slower at adopting these technologies than is socially eﬃcient.
14In a competitive industry, insurance companies cannot proﬁt from a coordinated change, because the
eﬃciency gains would be competed away in lower prices.
15See e.g. Dewees, Duﬀ and Trebilcock [1996] for evidence of substantial undercompensation. See also
the estimates of the Urban Institute [1991].
16We assume in this article that existing gasoline taxes of 20-40 cents per gallon account for these costs.
Many estimates, however, suggest that these costs may be much higher. Delucci [1997] estimates that the
pollution costs of motor vehicles in terms of extra mortality and morbidity are $26.5-$461.9 billion per year
in the U.S.7
Some caution is required, of course, in relying upon this paper’s estimates. This paper
oﬀers only a ﬁrst-cut estimate of the accident externality eﬀect, and the beneﬁt estimates
rely upon highly uncertain estimates of the price sensitivity of driving. Nonetheless, the es-
timates are large enough to strongly recommend further research, and provide some support
for policy reform.
Section 1 presents a simple model of accidents that formalizes Vickrey’s insights about
accident externalities and incorporates congestion. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
estimates the marginal accident cost of driving. Section 4 simulates driving and accident re-
ductions under per-mile premiums. Section 5 concludes and explores the policy implications
of this research.
1 A Simple Model of Accidents and Congestion.
We now develop a model relating driving to accidents and use it to simulate the conse-
quences of various pricing scenarios. For simplicity, we construct an entirely symmetric
model in which drivers, territory, and roads are undiﬀerentiated and identical. The central
insights continue to hold in a world where some drivers, roads, and territories are more
dangerous than others, with some provisos. The relationship between aggregate accidents
and aggregate miles will only hold exactly if the demand elasticity is the same across types
of driving and drivers. Otherwise, accidents wi l lb ee i t h e rm o r eo rl e s sr e s p o n s i v et od r i v i n g
according to whether extra miles are driven by more or less dangerous drivers under more
or less dangerous conditions.
We also limit attention to one and two vehicle accidents, ignoring the fact that many
accidents only occur because of the coincidence of three or more cars.17 We treat accidents
involving two or more cars as if they all involve only two cars because multi-vehicle accidents
are not separated in our accident data. Reﬁned data would increase our estimates of the
17For example, one car may stop suddenly causing the car behind to switch lanes to avoid a collision–
the accident occurs only if another car is unluckily in the adjacent lane.8
beneﬁts from the driving reductions associated with per-mile premiums because the size of
accident externalities increase with the number of cars involved in collisions.
Let
mi = miles traveled by driver i per year
M = aggregate vehicle miles traveled per year by all drivers
l =t o t a ll a n em i l e s
D =t r a ﬃcd e n s i t y ,o rt r a ﬃcv o l u m e=M/ l
fi =probability that i is driving at any given time
δ1 = damages from one-vehicle accident
δ2 = damages to each car in a two-vehicle accident
Holding speed constant, the fraction of the time that i is driving, fi, will be proportional
t ot h em i l e ss h ed r i v e s ,mi; hence fi = ρmi,f o rs o m eρ. For convenience, imagine that the
l lane miles are divided into L “locations” of equal length. An accident occurs between
driver i and j if they are in the same location and neither brakes or takes other successful
evasive action . The chance that i is driving and j i si nt h es a m el o c a t i o ni sfi (fj/L).L e t
q be the probability of accident conditional upon being in the same location. The expected





Summing over j 6= i and substituting ρmj for fj and ρmi for fj yields expected damages















Ignoring multiple-car accidents, the total expected accident damages suﬀered by driver i
are then
ai = c1mi + c2 miD.
The ﬁrst term in the equation reﬂects the fact that a driver may be involved in an
accident even if he is driving alone (e.g., fall i n ga s l e e pa tn i g h ta n dd r i v i n gi n t oat r e e ) ,
with c1 representing the expected accident costs from driving a mile alone. The second term
reﬂects the fact that the chance of getting into an accident with other vehicles in that mile
increases as the traﬃcd e n s i t yD increases. The linearity of this model in mi ignores the
possibility that practice and experience could bring down the per-mile risk, as well as the
oﬀsetting possibility that driving experience (which is generally a safe experience) could lead
to complacency and conceit. Empirical estimates of the elasticity of an individual’s accidents
with respect to that individual’s mileage, as surveyed in Edlin [1999], range from .35 to .92,
but as Edlin [1999] discusses, this work has been limited by the scarcity of reliable micro-
level data pairing mileage and accidents, and probably yields downward biased estimates
because of noisy mileage data and the diﬃculty of controlling for the factors that cause any
given driver to drive very little (which are likely related to accident propensity).18
Summing over each driver i yields the total accident costs:
A = c1M + c2MD= c1M + c2M2/l. (1)
Observe that the cost of two-car accidents c2M2/l increases with the square of total
18For an example of such a downward bias, consider Hu et al. [1998] who study an elderly population.
Omitted bad health variables seem likely to be positively correlated with worse driving and probably with
less driving as well. Mileage data in that study also come from survey and seem highly susceptible to
measurement error.10
miles. Aggregate accident costs are quadratic in aggregate vehicle miles traveled, and this
non-linearity is the source of the externality eﬀect.
The marginal total accident cost from driving an extra mile is
dA
dM
= c1 +2 c2D. (2)
In contrast, the marginal cost of accidents to driver i is only
dai
dmi
= c1 + c2D. (3)
The diﬀerence between these two costs, c2D, is the externality eﬀect. It represents the
fact that when driver i gets in an accident with another driver he is typically the “ but
for” cause of both drivers’ damages in the sense that, “but for” him having been driving,
the accident would not have happened. (Strangely enough, it is entirely possible that both
drivers are the “but for” cause of all damages). This model could overstate the externality
eﬀect because of accident substitution: i.e., because if driver A and B collide, it is possible
that driver A would have hit driver C if driver B weren’t there.19 Such a substitution eﬀect
would be captured in our regression estimates by a lower coeﬃcient on traﬃcd e n s i t y ,a n d
hence a lower estimate of the externality eﬀect.
Ad i ﬀerent view of the accident externality of driving is found by observing that the
average cost of accidents per mile driven is:
A
M
= c1 + c2D. (4)
A given driver who drives the typical mile expects to experience the average damages A
M.
Yet, this driver also increases D, which means that he also causes the accident rate for
19On the other hand, it understates the externality eﬀect to the extent that some collisions require more
than two vehicles.11






l . Multiplying this ﬁgure by the M vehicle miles
of driving aﬀected again yields an externality c2D.
The basic intuition behind the accident externality is simple. If a person decides to go
out driving instead of staying at home or using public transportation, she may end up in
an accident, and some of the cost of the accident will not be borne by either her or her
insurance company; some of the accident cost is borne by the other party to the accident or
that party’s insurance company (although the average mile is not subsidized, the marginal
mile is!).20
1.1 Gains from Per-mile Premiums.
We now compare the current insurance system, which we characterize (somewhat unfairly
as footnote 3 concedes) as involving lump sum premiums, with two alternative systems:
competitive per-mile premiums and Pigouvian per-mile premiums. As derived above, the




= c1 + c2M/l (5)
This equation can be viewed as the supply curve for insurance as a function of the number
of vehicle miles travelled requiring insurance. Again, in a more sophisticated model, and
in practice, rates would vary by risk class i, and break-even competitive prices would be
pi = Ai
Mi = c1i + c2iM/l, where subscript i’s have the natural meaning.
Let the utility of each of the n drivers be quasi-linear in the consumption of non-driving
goods y and quadratic in miles m:




20Another way to derive our formula for accidents, in which two-vehicle accidents are proportional to the
square of miles driven, is to begin with the premise that the marginal cost of a mile of driving is the expected
cost of accidents to both parties that will occur during that mile. Then the marginal cost of accidents will




M . The unique solution to this diﬀerential equation, in which
the elasticity of accidents with respect to miles is 2, is A2−car = c2M
2.12
Then, the aggregate demand will be linear:
M = M0 − bp (7)









If drivers continued to drive as much under per-mile premiums as they do under per-year,
i.e., if b=0 so that demand were completely inelastic, then insurance companies would
break-even by charging
p = c1 + c2M0/l.
however, for b>0, as driving falls in reaction to this charge, the accident rate per-mile
will also fall (because there will be fewer cars on the road with whom to collide). As the
per-mile accident rate falls, premiums will fall in a competitive insurance industry, as we
move down the average cost curve given by Equation (5).
Figure 1 depicts the situation. Let c0 be the non-accident costs of driving (gas, main-
tenance, etc.) and assume that drivers pay these costs in addition to per-mile insurance
premiums p. If drivers pay per year premiums so that p =0 , then they demand M0 miles of
driving. The social gain from charging per-mile accident premiums p∗ in this model equals
the reduction in accident costs less the lost beneﬁts from foregone driving, the shaded region

















(M0 − M∗) −
1
2
p∗ (M0 − M∗). (8)
The ﬁrst term is the reduction in accident costs that results from a fall in driving from M0
to M∗. The second is the driving beneﬁts lost from this reduction net of the non-accident
cost savings c0 (M0 − M∗).13
The marginal accident cost dA
dM is given by equation (2). Note that because the marginal
accident cost dA
dM lies above the average cost A
M, the competitive per-mile premium p∗is less
than the socially optimal accident charge which would lead to M∗∗miles driven. Socially
optimal accident charges will not result from competition because of the accident externality.










M∗∗ . We call this sum Pigouvian per-mile premiums. By assuming quasi-linear
utility, we are ignoring income eﬀects. As a per-year premium is shifted to a per-mile
charge, under other utility speciﬁcations, driving would not fall by as much as it would
under a pure price change, because people would no longer have to pay a yearly premium
and could use some of that money to purchase more driving than they would under a
pure price change. The liklihood of such income eﬀects are, however, overshadowed by our
uncertainty about the price responsiveness of driving, so it does not seem worthwhile to
consider them explicitly. We ultimately run policy simulations with elasticities of demand
chosen conservatively (i.e., on the low side), so our estimates are similar to what they
w o u l db ei fw eh a dad i ﬀerent utility assumption that allowed income eﬀects, but chose a
less conservative elasticity.
Our beneﬁt calculation assumes that the number of drivers would remain unchanged
in a switch to per-mile premiums. In fact, the number of drivers would probably increase
under a per-mile system because the total price of a small amount of driving (say 2,000
miles per year) would fall. Although the extra drivers, who drive relatively little, will
limit driving reductions and hence accident reductions somewhat, they would probably
increase the accident savings net of lost driving beneﬁts, and would surely do so in the case
of Pigouvian per-mile premiums. The reason is that these extra drivers gain substantial
driving beneﬁts, as evidenced by their willingness to pay insurance premiums. In the case
of Pigouvian per-mile premiums, the entry of these extra drivers necessarily increases the
beneﬁts from accident cost reductions net of lost driving beneﬁts.14
Pigouvian per-mile premiums could be implemented with a uniform percentage tax on
competitive per-mile premiums in either a fault-based tort system or a no-fault tort system,
as long as every driver stands an equal chance of being at fault. If drivers diﬀer in fault
propensity, then taxing premiums will work better in a no-fault system than in a tort system,
because the optimal tax will be invariant to a driver’s ability (i.e., invariant to expected
share of total damages from relative negligence). To the extent that a no-fault sytem limits
recovery to economic damages, as it commonly does in practice, the tax would need to be
raised to account for the full externality.
1.2 Congestion
Congestion will fall if driving is reduced. In a fundamental respect, congestion is the
counterpart to accidents. In the simplest model of congestion, congestion occurs when
driver i and j would be in the same location at the same time except that one or both
breaks to avoid an accident. The resulting delay is, of course, costly. A rudimentary model
of congestion would therefore have congestion costs rising with the square of miles, holding
lane miles ﬁxed, so that



















Equation (9) relates the average cost of delay to the marginal cost, so that we can
use Schrank, Turner and Lomax’s [1995] estimates of the average cost of delay in order to
estimate the marginal cost of delay, and in particular the external marginal cost of delay.
This formulation undoubtedly understates the marginal cost (and hence the external
cost) of congestion substantially, because as two vehicles slow down they generally force15
others to slow down as well. A cascade of such eﬀects becomes a traﬃcj a m . L o o k i n g
at measured ﬂow rates of traﬃc as a function of the number of cars travelling suggests
that during periods of congestion the marginal congestion cost of driving is often many
times, up to and exceeding 10 times, the average congestion experienced — at least during
highly congested periods.21 To be conservative, however, we assume that the marginal cost
of congestion is twice the average cost, so that the portion of the marginal cost that is
external to the driving decision equals the average cost.
Congestion cost savings that are external to the driving decision should also be added to
the beneﬁts from per-mile premiums. Assuming, that the mile foregone is a representative
mile and not a mile drawn from a particularly congested or uncongested time, the person
foregoing the mile will escape the average cost of delay, C
M. This savings should not be
counted though among our beneﬁts from driving reductions, because it is internalized.
Viewed diﬀerently, each person derives no net beneﬁt from her marginal mile of driving,
because she chooses to drive more miles until driving beneﬁts net of congestion cost just
equal operating costs. Yet, as there is less traﬃc on the road, other drivers will experience
reduced delays and this external eﬀect should be added to our calculations. The external
eﬀect, as with accidents, equals the diﬀerence between the marginal and average cost of





As a proxy for auto accident costs, we use state-level data on total private passenger auto
insurance premiums from the National Association of Auto Insurance Commissioners (1998,
Table 7). We subtract premiums paid for comprehensive coverage, so that we are left only
21Author’s calculation based upon traﬃc ﬂow tables. GAO, “Traﬃc Congestion: Trends, Measures, and
Eﬀects” GAO/PEMD-90-1, November 1989, p. 39.16
with accident coverage. If the insurance industry is competitive, these ﬁgures represent the
true economic measure of insured accident costs, which includes the administrative cost
of the insurance industry and an ordinary return on the capital of that industry. These
premium data are for private passenger vehicles, so we adjust these ﬁgures to account
for commercial premiums by multiplying by 1.14, the national ratio of total premiums to
noncommercial premiums.22
Insured accident costs do not come close to comprising all accident costs. The pain and
suﬀering of at fault drivers is not insured, and auto insurance frequently does not cover their
lost wages. (In no-fault states, pain and suﬀering is also not compensated below certain
thresholds). These omitted damages are substantial and their inclusion would raise our
estimates of the cost of driving and the beneﬁt of driving reduction signiﬁcantly. Pain and
suﬀering is often taken to be three times the economic losses from bodily injury.
Other data come from a variety of sources. Data on the miles of lanes by state come from
Table HM-60, 1996 Highway Statistics, FHWA. Annual vehicle miles by state come from
Table VM-2, 1996 Highway Statistics, FHWA. Data on the distribution of fuel eﬃciency
among vehicles in the current U.S. ﬂeet, and the distribution of miles by fuel eﬃciency of
car come from the 1994 Residential Transportation Energy Consumption Survey. We get
gasoline prices by state from the Petroleum Marketing Monthly, EIA, Table 31 (”all grades,
sales to end users through retail outlets excluding taxes”) and Table EN-1 (federal and state
motor gasoline taxes).
3T h e t r a ﬃc density-accident relationship.
The social elasticity of accidents with respect to miles of driving should substantially exceed
an individual’s elasticity because of the externality eﬀect explained in the previous section.
Even if the typical individual has an elasticity of .5, the elasticity of total accident costs
22See, p.22, the Insurance Information Institute 1998 Fact Book.17
with respect to total miles driven would be close to 1 because any individual driver will
cause others to have extra accidents when he drives more. One piece of evidence on the
social elasticity comes from a study of California freeways from 1960-1962 (Lundy, 1964
cited in Vickrey, 1968). A group of 32 segments of four lane freeways with low average
traﬃc had a per-mile accident rate of 1.18 per million miles compared with 1.45 per million
m i l e so nt w e n t ys e g m e n t sw i t hm o r et r a ﬃc. The implied incremental accident rate was
1.98 accidents per million vehicle miles, suggesting an elasticity of accidents with respect to
miles of 1.7=1.98/1.18. Because of the externality associated with driving pointed out in
Section 1, we expect the elasticity of total accidents with respect to total miles to exceed the
elasticity of an individual’s accidents with respect to her driving. In fact, if an individual
has an elasticity of 1 as the model assumes, the ”aggregate” elasticity would be 2 if all
accidents involved 2 cars. The California highway data accords roughly with what one
would predict given that roughly 30% of accidents involve only one vehicle.23
It is worth comparing accident costs in pairs of states that have similar numbers of lane
miles but very diﬀerent numbers of vehicle miles traveled. For example, New Jersey and
Wyoming both have approximately 75,000 lane miles. New Jersey has eight and a half times
as much driving, however, and has an average insured accident cost of 7.7 cents per mile
traveled instead of the 1.8 cents per mile of Wyoming. Comparing Ohio and Oklahoma we
see a similar pattern. Ohio has approximat e l yt w oa n dah a l ft i m e sa sm u c hd r i v i n go na
similar number of lane miles and has higher average accident cost (3.6 vs. 2.6 cents per
mile). Likewise, if we compare Hawaii and Delaware, which have similar numbers of vehicle
miles traveled, we ﬁnd that Hawaii, which has fewer lane miles and so substantially higher
traﬃc density, has substantially higher accident costs per-mile. In general, average accident
costs are much higher in states that have a lot more driving, holding lane miles ﬁxed. This
feature, which drives the high insurance rates in dense areas, is just another view of the
23See table 27, U.S. Department of Transportation [1997].18
externality eﬀect. The fact that marginal accident costs are higher than average accident
costs is what drives up average accident costs as miles increase.
Many other idiosyncratic factors are involved, however, in a state’s insurance costs.
Maryland and Massachusetts, for example, have an almost identical number of lane miles
and fairly similar vehicle miles traveled. However, although Massachusetts drivers only
drive about 7 percent more miles per year in aggregate than Maryland drivers their average
costs per-mile is 40 percent higher (6.7 cents vs. 4.8 cents), so that total insured accident
costs are 45 percent higher. Whether this diﬀerence is attributable to diﬀerences between
Massachusetts and Maryland drivers or diﬀerences between the roads or weather in the
states is unknown. Cars may also be more expensive to repair in Massachusetts.
Here, we ﬁt the model presented in Section 1 in order to form estimates of the marginal
accident cost from driving an extra mile in each of the 50 states. As explained in Section 3,
we use total auto accident insurance premiums paid in a state as a proxy for the total cost of
automobile accidents. We estimate the eﬀects of traﬃc density on accidents in two ways–
by a calibration method and a regression method– as described below. The regression
method utilizes the cross-state variation in traﬃc density to estimate its eﬀect, while the
calibration method relies upon the structure of the model and data on the percentage of
accidents involving multiple vehicles. Each method has weaknesses, and after discussing
the likely biases in each of these methods, we conclude that the true eﬀect of density lies
somewhere between the two estimates. The traﬃcd e n s i t ye ﬀect allows us to estimate
the social marginal accident cost of driving and the extent to which this cost exceeds the
average, or internalized marginal, cost of driving.
We modify the model of Section 1, assuming that each state’s idiosyncratic errors εs
enter multiplicatively as follows:19
As
Ms
=( c1 + c2Ds)(1 + εs). (10)
= c1s + c2sDs, (11)
where
c1s = c1(1 + εs)
c2s = c2(1 + εs)
and where s indexes states.
Once c1 and c2 a r ee s t i m a t e d ,w ec a nﬁnd the idiosyncratic component εs for each state
from the above equation using the observed values of accident costs, miles traveled and lane
miles in the state. We estimate the coeﬃcients c1 and c2 in two ways – a calibration model
and a regression model.
In our calibration model, we utilize national data on the percentage of accidents involving
multiple cars. Assume that national accident costs are given by
A = c1M + c2MD,




Let a be the average damage per insured vehicle from an accident, so that two-vehicle
accidents have total damages of 2a and one-vehicle accidents have damages a.L e tr denote20
the proportion of accidents that involve two vehicles. (Nationally, 71% of crashes were
multiple-vehicle crashes in 1996, and we assume that multi-car accidents involve only two
cars, since we don’t have data on the number of cars in multi-car accidents and since this
assumption makes our beneﬁt estimate conservative.)24
If N is the total number of accidents in a state we have:








and similarly for two-car accidents
A2 = 2r
1+rA.
The one and two-car accident coeﬃcients can then be determined from the formulas:











Using the observed national data on accident costs (A), miles traveled (M), and lane
miles (l), we estimate that the one-vehicle coeﬃcient ˆ c1 is roughly .007 dollars per-mile,
24The statistic 71% is found by taking the ratio of the number of multiple vehicle crashes to total crashes
in table 27, U.S. Department of Transportation [1997]. This ﬁgure understates the number of accidents that
involve multiple vehicles because if a single vehicle crashes into a ﬁxed object, for example, that is a single
vehicle crash even if the vehicle swerved to avoid another car.21
while ˆ c2 is 1.1 x 10−7 dollars per-mile squared per lane mile. This means that roughly 18%
of costs are attributed to one-car accidents.
In our regression model, we estimate the coeﬃcients c1 and c2 with a cross-sectional
regression. Assuming that the idiosyncratic components εs are i.i.d. mean zero random
variables that are independent of Ds, OLS estimates ˆ c1 and ˆ c2 are consistent under standard
regularity conditions. Table 1 gives the results of the cross-sectional OLS regression in
column 2 and the calibration method in column 1.
T h ee s t i m a t eo ft h eo n e - v e h i c l ec o e ﬃcient ˆ c1 suggests a cost of 2.2 cents per-mile. The
other coeﬃcient, ˆ c2, is 5.4 x10−6 cents per squared mile per lane mile. The regression model
suggests that 55% of costs are attributable to one-car accidents, i.e., to the linear term.




= c1s +2 c2sDs.
We ﬁnd the state-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcients for one and two vehicle accidents as follows:
ˆ c1s =ˆ c1(1 + ˆ εs)
ˆ c2s =ˆ c2(1 + ˆ εs)
ˆ εs = As
ˆ c1Ms+ˆ c2MsDs − 1.
Table 2 gives the marginal accident costs estimated by the calibration and regression
methods. Table 2 allows us to compare these costs with the average accident cost per-mile
driven, which appears in column 3. The last row models the U.S. as a whole, treating it as a
single state. As we see, accounting for the Vickrey externality appears signiﬁcant regardless
of which method we use, in that the marginal cost of accidents signiﬁcantly exceeds the
average cost. The reason is that both estimation methods put signiﬁcant positive weight
on the quadratic term. The elasticity of accidents with respect to miles (i.e. the ratio of22
marginal to average cost) is higher under the calibration model because that model puts
more weight on the quadratic term. Below, we discuss several reasons why the regression
estimates probably understate the density eﬀect (and hence the marginal cost of driving),
and why the calibration estimates may overstate this eﬀect.
The calibration method might overstate accident externalities because the theoretical
model does not account for accident substitution– i.e., the possibility that if one of the
drivers in a two-car accident stayed home, another accident might have substituted for the
one that happened. 25 (This bias could be oﬀset, though, by the fact that many accidents
require the coincidence of more than two cars at the same place at the same time). A
second upward bias results because in the calibration method, c1and c2 are held constant,
which does does not account for the fact that as driving becomes more dangerous, drivers
and states both take precautionary measures. States react to higher accident rates with
higher expenditures on safety by widening roads and lengthening freeway on-ramps. Drivers
also make ﬁnancial expenditures, buying air bags or anti-lock brakes, and nonﬁnancial
expenditures, by paying more attention and slowing down to avoid accidents when driving
in heavy traﬃc. All these precautionary measures mitigate the impact of extra traﬃcd e n s i t y
on accidents. At the margin, if precautions are chosen optimally so that the marginal cost
of precautions equals their marginal beneﬁt, then the envelope theorem guarantees that the
calibration method would still be properly capturing the sum of accident and prevention
costs (i.e., we can treat prevention as being ﬁxed). However, to the extent that people
take too little precaution at the moment, the calibration results will overstate the accident
externalities. Even if precautions are currently optimal, the calibration results will overstate
accident externalities for large changes in behavior, because the marginal analysis of the
envelope theorem will not be applicable.
25For example if vehicle A plows into a line of cars stopped at a light, removing vehicle B from the line
might not aﬀect the damage.23
T h er e g r e s s i o nm e t h o dp i c k su pb o t ho ft h ee ﬀects above, but unfortunately has several
biases of its own that tend to make it understate the eﬀects of density (accident externali-
ties). Two reasons revolve around the fact that we use insurance premiums as our measure
of accident costs. As mentioned at the paper’s outset, a substantial portion of accident costs
are not insured. If this fraction were constant across states, it would bias our calibration
and regression estimates down equally. However, states with more miles driven per lane
mile and higher accident costs have higher insurance premiums, and according to Smith
and Wright (1992), states with higher premiums will have substantially more uninsured
motorists.26 With fewer drivers insured, a smaller share of total accident costs would be
insured. This eﬀect could bias our regression estimates of marginal cost downward signiﬁ-
cantly. Another potential downward bias for the regression results is that as accident rates
and insurance costs rise, states tend to adopt no-fault insurance reform limiting coverage
of noneconomic losses so that again the percentage of costs that are insured would be lower
in high-cost states.
A third source of bias, which is probably substantial, is that our measure of traﬃc
density for a given state is a noisy measure of the traﬃcd e n s i t yw h e r et h et y p i c a lm i l e
is driven in that state because of within-state heterogeneity. In particular, adding a lot
of miles of empty rural roads would not reduce the traﬃcd e n s i t yw h e r ep e o p l ed r i v e ,n o r
the number of accidents, but would reduce the predicted number of accidents from our
regression because the average traﬃc density would fall. This observation may explain
the large positive residuals in New York, for example. Noise in our measure of traﬃc
density would tend to lower our estimates of the accident cost of density. A ﬁnal source of
downward bias is that the precautionary expenditures discussed above, which are induced
by high traﬃc density, are not included in our measure of insured accident costs.
26In fact, they argue that there is a feedback loop so that high premiums cause more uninsured motorists
and therefore still higher premiums.24
To summarize, there are several reasons that the regression estimates underestimate the
eﬀect of density (and hence the marginal cost of accidents), while the calibration results
overestimate the eﬀect. The truth probably lies between these estimates, so we will treat
them as framing the reasonable range of estimates.
4 Policy simulations.
4.1 Methodology.
This section estimates and compares the potential beneﬁts of charging per-mile premiums
with and without a Pigouvian tax. Competitive per-mile premiums are ﬁx e di nt h es i m u -
lations at rates just suﬃcient to allow insurance companies to break even, exactly covering
accident costs. The Pigouvian per-mile premiums simulations assume a tax on premiums to
account for the externalities of accidents. Both sets of simulations assume that an individual
pays premiums in proportion to the miles she drives. As the introduction discussed, such
policies would most likely be implemented so that per-mile rates varied among drivers or
vehicles based upon the same territory, driving record, and other factors that are currently
used to vary per-year rates. Since our estimates are based on statewide aggregates, they
ignore substantial heterogeneity among regions and drivers within each state. Our estimates
therefore considerably understate the potential beneﬁts of both these policies, because if
high risk drivers pay the highest per-mile rates, then driving reductions will be concentrated
among these drivers, where they are most eﬀective at reducing accidents.
Our calculations also ignore the costs and diﬃculty of verifying the number of miles
traveled, two issues discussed in the ﬁnal section. However, they do account for the cost
of foregone driving beneﬁts caused by the voluntary reduction in mileage that would result
from insurance being charged by the mile, as opposed to the current system of by the year.
For each policy option we estimate the consequences under three models of accident
determination–linear, calibration, and regression. The linear model assumes that accidents25
are proportional to miles driven, i.e. that As = c1sMs. This model takes no account of the
externalities from driving, nor the related fact that as people reduce their driving, accident
rates per mile should fall because there are fewer drivers on the road with whom to have an
accident. The regression and calibration models include a term that is quadratic in miles to
account for the externality eﬀect. The one and two-car accident coeﬃcients are determined
for these two models as described in the previous section.
We estimate a linear model for two reasons. First, the eﬃciency savings under a linear
model are the straightforward gains from more eﬃcient contracting that a single company
(with a small market share) and its customers could together expect to receive if they
alone switched to per-mile pricing. (Once other ﬁrms followed suit all these gains would
go to customers). Comparing the linear model with the calibration and regression models,
therefore allows us to see how much of the accident savings are external to a given driver
and his insurance company. The second reason to be interested in the linear model results
is the possibility of substantial learning-by-doing in driving that is not exhausted after the
ﬁrst couple of years. If driving more lowers an individual’s accident rate so that the typical
individual has an accident elasticity with respect to miles of 1/2,27 then after accounting
for the externality eﬀect, the aggregate elasticity of accidents with respect to miles should
be approximately 1 as assumed in the linear model.
Our estimates of the results of these policies naturally depend upon the price responsive-
ness of driving. Estimates of the price responsiveness of driving are plentiful and generally
come from observed changes in the price of gasoline.
Our benchmark case assumes that the aggregate elasticity of gasoline demand with
respect to the price of gasoline is .15. This ﬁgure is 25% lower than the short-run elasticity
of .2 that the two comprehensive surveys by Dahl and Sterner [1991 a,b] conclude is the
most plausible estimate, and also substantially lower than the miles elasticities estimated
27See, for example, the estimates in Hu et al. [1998] that were discussed in Edlin [1999].26
by Gallini [1983]. Goldberg [1998, p. 15] has recently made an estimate of miles elasticity
near zero, though she argues that for large price changes such as those we consider here, a
ﬁgure of .2 is more reasonable.28 Goldberg’s standard errors are suﬃciently large that her
estimate is also not statistically diﬀerent from .2 at the ﬁve percent level.
>From the perspective of social policy, we should be interested in long run elasticities.
Long run elasticities appear to be considerably larger than short run. Goodwin’s [1992]
survey suggests that time series studies give long run elasticities for petrol of .71 compared
with .27 for the short run; cross section studies give .84 compared with .28 for the short
run. Interpreting these long run elasticities in our context is problematic because in the long
run, there is substantial substitution among vehicles to more fuel-eﬃcient vehicles which
will be driven more miles. Still, Johansson and Schipper [1997] estimate that the long run
elasticity of miles per car with respect to fuel price is .2. Given vehicle substitution, this
ﬁgure suggests that the beneﬁts of per-mile premiums would, in the long run, be much
larger than we estimate.
>From our assumed ﬂeet gas price elasticity of .15, we compute the mile-price elasticity
(which we assume is constant across vehicles) as follows. Let
µi = m i l e st r a v e l e db yc a r so ff u e le ﬃciency i miles per gallon.
e = the point elasticity of a given vehicle’s miles with respect to marginal price per mile
(assumed constant across vehicles).
gi = gas price per mile.
ti = total marginal price per mile =4 .2 cents (maintenance)+5cents (depreciation)+
gi(gas price)+pi(insurance price)29
ε = .15 = aggregate point elasticity of gasoline demand with respect to price of gasoline.
28Miles elasticity and gas elasticity diﬀer by the elasticity of fuel eﬃciency with respect to fuel price. In
the short run, this elasticity is probably relatively small, though in the long run it could be substantial.27
Note that since e is the miles elasticity for each vehicle with respect to marginal price
per mile, it is also the gasoline demand elasticity for that vehicle with respect to marginal
price per mile. Then e
gi
ti is both the mile elasticity and gasoline elasticity with respect to
the price of gasoline for a vehicle with fuel eﬃciency i mpg. Since the proportion of gasoline





, we can solve for e using the following
relationship:












Assuming that driving demand is linear, and each car of fuel eﬃciency i is charged the





subscript 0 denotes the value variables take on under current practice, with zero marginal
insurance charges).33
Solving this driving demand equation simultaneously with the per-mile premium zero
proﬁt condition (equation (5)) yields the equilibrium miles M∗ and per-mile premiums p∗.
We ﬁrst compute this equilibrium for each state. We then model the U.S. in two ways:
ﬁrst, in a disaggregated model where the national mile reduction is the sum of state mile
reductions and second, treating the nation in an aggregated fashion as if it itself were a
state. We use the equilibrium values p∗
s,M∗
s to compute surplus in each state s according
to equation (8).
Finally, to simulate Pigouvian per-mile premiums, we replace the zero proﬁt condition
with the requirement that premiums equal the marginal social accident cost of driving.
Thus, the “supply” equation for insured miles under Pigouvian per-mile premiums is
p = c1 +2 c2M/l
33For a linear demand curve D(t) with a point elasticity of e at price t0, the reduction in demand from a
price increase ∆tis exactly D(t0)e
∆t
t0 .28








Table 3 presents our estimates of the consequences of switching to per-mile premiums. The
zero proﬁt condition for insurance companies is that per-mile premiums equal the average
i n s u r a n c ec o s to fa c c i d e n t sp e rm i l ed r i v e n . T h e s ep r e m i u mﬁgures are quite high and
exceed the cost of gasoline in many states as Table 2 shows. Even with the modest price
elasticity of .15 assumed here, the resulting driving reduction is substantial. The national
reduction in vehicle miles traveled, M0 − M∗, , is approximately 10% in all three models,
and reaches 15% in high-traﬃc states. The reduction is somewhat less in the nonlinear
models than it is in the linear ones, because in the nonlinear models, as driving is reduced,
the risk of accidents also falls and with it, per-mile premiums. Since equilibrium per-mile
premiums are lower in these models, the total driving reduction is lower. This eﬀect is
much more pronounced in the calibration model, because of the larger traﬃcd e n s i t ye ﬀect
from two-car accidents in this model. Under the calibration models in Massachusetts, the
per-mile charge falls from 6.7 cents per-mile to 5.8 cents per-mile as driving is reduced.
Even with this fall, per-mile charges remain roughly comparable to the cost of gasoline,
making the expected driving reduction roughly 15%.
Reductions in driving would naturally be much larger in states that currently have high
insurance costs and would thus face high per-mile premiums. For example, if we compare
N e wJ e r s e yw i t hW y o m i n g( t w os t a t e swith similar lane miles but very diﬀerent vehicle
miles traveled (VMT), we ﬁnd that implementing competitive per-mile premiums would
reduce New Jersey’s VMT by 16.4 percent under our calibration model versus 4.4 percent29
in Wyoming. The reduction is much larger in New Jersey because the higher traﬃcd e n s i t y
there leads to higher accident rates: the per-mile premium in New Jersey would be 6.5 cents
per-mile as compared to 1.8 in Wyoming.
None of the per-mile premiums have been adjusted for uninsured drivers, because data
on the percentage of uninsured drivers is poor. Estimates of the percentage of uninsured
drivers are often in the neighborhood of 25% (see Khazzoom [1997], Sugarman [1993],
and Smith and Wright [1992]). Our estimates of the per-mile premium are calculated by
dividing estimated insured accident costs by total miles driven rather than by insured miles
driven. This could substantially understate the actual per-mile premiums if total miles
substantially exceed insured miles. However, it wouldn’t change our estimates of aggregate
driving reductions signiﬁcantly because even though the per-mile premium would be higher
for insured miles, it would be zero for uninsured miles.34
These driving reductions lead us to predict lower insurance (and accident) costs of $14
billion according to the regression model and $17 billion according to the calibration model.
Even after subtracting lost driving beneﬁts (the second term in equation (8) , the beneﬁts
we estimate for accident savings net of lost driving beneﬁts remain substantial in all three
models. Nationally, these net accident savings range from $5.3 billion to $12.7 billion, as
T a b l e3r e p o r t s . T h ed i ﬀerence between our $5.3 billion estimate under the linear model
and our $12.7 billion under the calibration model is dramatic: Accounting for accident
externalities raises our estimate of beneﬁts by 150 percent. Such a large diﬀerence makes
sense. If a price change for driver A causes her to drive less, much of her reduction in
accident losses is oﬀset by her lost driving beneﬁts. In contrast, every driver with whom
she might have had an accident, gains outright from the reduced probability of having an
34Let u be the fraction of uninsured drivers and ˆ p be our estimate of true per-mile premiums. If premium
ˆ p
1−u is charged on (1−u) percent of miles, then the aggregate mile reduction is identical to our estimate given
linear demand. Some revenue shortfall could be expected because priced miles fall by a larger percentage
than in our estimate. However, this is approximately oﬀset by the fact that insured accident losses could be
expected to fall by more than we estimate, because driving reductions would be concentrated in the insured
population.30
accident with A who is driving less. Taking this externality eﬀect into account, nationally,
the net gain is $75 per insured vehicle under the calibration model, as reported in Table 3.
However, since insurance companies and their customers don’t take the externality beneﬁts
into account, their view of the gain from per-mile premiums is probably closer to the $31 of
o u rl i n e a rm o d e l . 35 In high traﬃc density states, the gain per insured vehicle is quite high
— approximately $150 in Massachusetts and New York and nearly $200 in Hawaii and New
Jersey under the calibration model.
Compare the net accident reductions in the last two rows of Table 3. Accident reductions
are about 10 percent higher when the U.S. is modeled in a disaggregated way. In the
National Aggregated Model, heterogeneity is ignored and the U.S. is modeled as if it were a
state and a uniform per-mile premium were charged in every state. This estimate therefore
does not pick up one of the important beneﬁts of allowing competition to determine the
level of per-mile premiums. In a competitive insurance market, there are no cross-subsidies
among territories, so high prices are charged in areas that have high accident rates, where
the beneﬁts from driving reduction will be highest. Each of our state estimates suﬀers
from the same problem. Our beneﬁt estimates from per-mile premiums are lower than they
would be in competitive insurance markets, because there is substantial variation within
a state in traﬃc density and accident rates. As we pointed out earlier, areas with high
accident rates will be charged higher per-mile premiums and therefore experience larger
driving reductions. If within-state heterogeneity is similar to across-state heterogeneity, we
could expect that our estimates of net accident gains are 10 percent lower than actual gains
would be. Taking into account heterogeneity among drivers, as would happen naturally
under a competitive system of per-mile premiums, would increase beneﬁts still further.
A l lo fo u rb e n e ﬁt estimates depend critically of course on driving elasticities. Driving
35State Farm, the largest auto insurance carrier in the U.S., has a 20-25% market share and so captures up
to a quarter of these “external” beneﬁts — and therefore has a larger incentive to adopt premium schedules
that reduce driving than does an insurance carrier with a very small market share.31
reductions and net accident savings are both higher (respectively lower) if the aggregate gas
demand elasticity is higher (respectively lower) than .15. The relationship between elasticity
and accident savings is somewhat sub-linear, however, because the externality eﬀect means
that gains are smaller when there is less driving. Nationally, net accident beneﬁts go from
$9 billion for an elasticity of .1 to $16 billion for an elasticity of .2, using the calibration
model.
In general, the estimates of net accident cost savings under the regression model are
signiﬁcantly smaller than under the calibration model. This diﬀerence results from the
regression model putting little weight on the externality eﬀect. As we have argued, this
very small weight is probably due to several likely biases resulting from state errors being
negatively correlated with traﬃc density. We therefore concentrate our attention on the
calibration results.
Our calculation of net accident cost savings under the calibration model does not account
for the possibility that reduced traﬃc density causes drivers to drive less carefully, or causes
states to spend less money making roads safe. It is likely that as traﬃc diminishes, people
will exercise less care, and so actual accident costs will not fall as much as we estimate.
However, this eﬀect is not necessarily a criticism of the calibration model estimates. At the
margin, this observation simply implies that some of our estimated accident cost reductions
will actually materialize as reductions in the cost of accident prevention. Assuming that the
tort system is currently ensuring an optimal level of care, our calculation will be accurate for
small reductions in driving. Some inaccuracy due to infra-marginal eﬀects are possible, but
these are probably small given that we are only considering driving reductions of 10-15%.
These calculations also ignore the fact that more drivers will choose to become insured
once they have the option of economizing on insurance premiums by only driving a few
miles. Today, some of these low-mileage drivers are driving uninsured while others are not
driving at all. To the extent that per-mile premiums attract new drivers, the reduction in32
vehicle miles traveled will not be as large as our simulations predict. Surprisingly, though
this observation does not mean that the social beneﬁts are lower than we predict. In fact,
they are probably higher. The per-year insurance system is ineﬃcient to the extent that
low-mileage drivers who would be willing to pay the true accident cost of their driving
choose not to drive, because they must currently pay the accident cost of those driving
many more miles. Giving them an opportunity to drive and pay by the mile creates surplus
if their driving beneﬁts exceed the social cost (their beneﬁts would always exceed the social
cost under Pigouvian per-mile premiums since they are choosing to pay the social cost, and
beneﬁts probably exceed costs under per-mile premiums since they pay most of the social
cost).
4.2.2 Pigouvian Per-Mile Premiums.
Finally, consider Table 4, which presents our results for Pigouvian per-mile premiums.
Pigouvian per-mile premiums would involve a tax on premiums suﬃciently large that a
driver pays the full accident cost of his driving accounting for accident externalities. We
calculate the Pigouvian tax here under the assumption that auto insurance premiums reﬂect
all accident costs. As we discussed in the introduction, the bulk of accident costs are not
covered by auto insurance. In particular, auto insurance covers a small fraction of the value
of statistical lives lost, and also doesn’t cover the pain and suﬀering of at fault drivers. The
reader should therefore keep in mind that truly optimal Pigouvian taxes would account for
these costs and would be substantially higher than those we use for our estimates.36




, so the Pigouvian tax is 0. In our calibration and regression models, however, which
take account of the accident externalities, the marginal cost of accidents exceeds the average
cost. In consequence, the Pigouvian tax is substantial. Under the calibration model, an
36The fact that life insurance or other insurance serves in part to ﬁll the compensation gap between auto
insurance and full compensation does not take away from this point.33
appropriate Pigouvian tax would be about 90% in high traﬃc density states such as New
Jersey and about 40% in low density states like North Dakota. On average across the U.S.,
the Pigouvian tax would be 83% under the calibration model compared with 19% under
the regression model. For the calibration model, the Pigouvian tax makes national driving
reductions 15.7% instead of 9.2%. National net accident savings grow to $15.3 billion from
$12.7 billion, as seen in Table 4.
4.3 Delay Costs from Congestion
T h ec o s to ft r a ﬃc delays are a large concern,37 and one ancillary beneﬁto fp e r - m i l ep r e m i -
ums and of the Pigouvian tax would be to reduce congestion related delays as driving falls.
As discussed in Section 1.2, not all of the resulting time savings should be added to the
social gain calculated above, however. Some of congestion costs are already internalized by
drivers and reﬂected in the driving demand curve. This subsection provides rough estimates
of the external portion of these cost savings. As section 1.2 explained, our methodology
should result in a lower bound.
A detailed study by Schrank, Turner and Lomax [1995] estimates that the cost of conges-
tion in the form of delay and increased fuel consumption in the U.S. exceeded $49 billion in
1992 and $31 billion in 1987.38 This study valued time at $8.50/hr. in 1987 and $10.50/hr.
in 1992, which will seem a considerable undercounting to those who would far prefer to be
at work than stuck in a traﬃcj a m . I fw ep r o j e c tt h i sﬁgure to $60 billion in 1995, this
amounts to 2.5 cents for every mile driven. As discussed in presenting our model, although
the marginal cost of congestion is many times the average cost of congestion during con-
gested periods, we conservatively assume that the marginal cost of congestion is twice the
37A recent poll by Mark Baldarassare shows that voters in California are “most satisﬁed with their jobs”
and “most negative about traﬃc.” New York Times 6/2/98, A1, “Economy Fades As Big Issue in Newly
Surging California.”
38My summation for the 50 urban areas they studied. See Table A-9, p. 13, and Table A-15, p. 19, in
Shrank, Turner and Lomax [1995]. See also Delucci [1997], who estimates congestion costs at $22.5-99.3
billion.34
average cost, so that the external marginal cost of congestion equals the average. Table
5 gives our estimates of the national portion of congestion reduction that is external and
should be added to net accident beneﬁts. In all models, estimated externalized gains from
congestion reductions are large, ranging from $5.5 billion to $9.4 billion as seen in Table
5. Under per-mile premiums, congestion reductions are largest in the regression and linear
models because in those models, accident rates (and hence per-mile premiums) don’t fall
much or at all as driving falls. In contrast, the congestion reductions for per-mile premiums
with a Pigouvian tax are largest ($9.4 billion) under the calibration model, because of the
substantial driving reductions caused by the large Pigouvian tax that accounts for accident
externalities from driving.
These calculations are based upon the average cost of delay. Congestion delays, of
course, are concentrated during certain peak time periods and at certain locations. This
fact simply means that the congestion reductions from per-mile pricing are concentrated
during these time periods and these locations. Our calculations are robust provided that the
elasticities of demand for congested miles and non-congested miles are comparable, and that
the externalized marginal cost is a constant multiple of average cost.39 The concentration
of congestion costs simply suggest that we would be even better oﬀ if driving were priced
particularly high during congested periods and somewhat lower otherwise.
4.4 Total Beneﬁts.
Table 5 gives total estimated annual national beneﬁts from competitive per-mile premiums
and Pigouvian per-mile premiums. The total beneﬁts are expressed both in aggregate
39To understand why, consider a model with two types of miles: A,B. Let the initial quantities of driving
these miles be a, b,a n dl e tCa,C b be the total cost of delay during driving of types A,B respectively. Then,
the average cost of delay is c =
Ca+Cb
a+b , and the average cost of delay during driving of the two types is
ca = Ca/a,cb = Cb/b. The externalized marginal congestion costs are likewise ca,c b.O b s e r v e t h a t i f a
uniform per mile price p is charged for both types of miles, the congestion savings will be
pε
g [aca + bcb]=
pε
g (Ca + Cb),w h e r eg is the initial gas cost per mile of driving, and ε is the elasticity of miles with respect
to the price of gasoline. This is equivalent to what we would calculate if we treated the two types of miles
equivalently, with c as the externalized marginal cost of miles. Then we would estimate the congestion
reduction as:
pε
g [a + b]c =
pε
g (Ca + Cb).35
and per insured vehicle. These annual beneﬁts are quite high and using the regression
estimates as our lower bound and the calibration estimates as our upper bound suggests
that charging by the mile on a national basis would be socially beneﬁcial if verifying miles
could be achieved for less than $91.5—$107.5 per car each year. In some high traﬃcd e n s i t y
states, per-mile premiums could be socially beneﬁcial even if the cost of verifying miles
approached $200 per vehicle. External beneﬁts made up $20-$24 billion of our estimated
beneﬁts since net accident savings were only $5 billion under the linear model, as reported in
Table 5. The gains with a Pigouvian tax were higher still at $111-$146 per insured vehicle.
These estimates neglect environmental gains that would result if the current price of gasoline
does not adequately account for emissions, noise pollution and road maintenance. Likewise,
they would overstate gains if current gasoline taxes exceed those nonaccident noncongestion
costs. Our estimates also did not account for underinsured and uninsured accident costs.
Including these latter ﬁgures into our estimates of eliminated accident externalities would
raise the estimated beneﬁts by several billion dollars more.
The total beneﬁts are quite large even for the linear model where accidents are propor-
tional to mileage. Under the linear model, the total beneﬁts of per-mile premiums are $67
per insured vehicle. As mentioned early, this model would be roughly accurate if individual
elasticities of accidents with respect to miles were .5, because then the externality eﬀect
would make the social elasticity roughly one, as in a linear model. Estimates under the
regression model lie roughly halfway in between the linear model and the calibration model.
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
In all three models, the aggregate beneﬁts of per-mile premiums are quite large. They are
concentrated in states with high traﬃc density where accident costs and the externality
eﬀect appear particularly large. Aggregate beneﬁts reach $11 billion nationally, or over $67
per insured vehicle even under the linear model, and are substantially larger ($15-18 billion)36
under our preferred regression or calibration models. In high traﬃc density states like New
Jersey, the beneﬁts from reduced accident costs, net of lost driving beneﬁts could be as high
as $198 per insured vehicle, as indicated in Table 3.
Why then are most premiums so weakly linked to actual mileage and closer to per-year
than per-mile premiums? Standard contracting analysis predicts that an insurance company
and its customers would not strike a deal with a lump-sum premium if an individual’s
accidents increase with his driving, and if vehicle miles is freely observable. In that case,
by reducing or eliminating the lump-sum portion and charging the marginal claim cost for
each mile of driving, the contract can be made more proﬁtable for the insurance company
and also more attractive to its customers: as individuals reduce their driving, the insurance
carrier saves more in claims than the lost driving beneﬁts to its customers. Hence the
“mystery.”
The primary reason we don’t see per-mile premiums is probably monitoring costs, the
reason suggested by Rea [1992] and by some insurance executives. Traditionally the only
reliable means of verifying mileage was thought to be bringing a vehicle to an odometer-
checking station. The twin sister of these monitoring costs is that a ﬁrm charging per-mile
premiums would suﬀer abnormally high claims from those who committed odometer fraud.
The signiﬁcance of monitoring costs/fraud costs as an explanation is supported by the fact
that commercial policies (where the stakes are larger) are sometimes per-mile, and now
that cheap technologies exist that allow mileage veriﬁcation “at a distance,” at least one
ﬁrm is now experimenting with per-mile premiums.40 Adverse selection provides another
explanation that tends to close the per-mile premiums market.41
40See Wall Street Journal [1999].
41Adverse selection is another reason that a given insurance company may not want to switch to per-mile
premiums on its own. Even if the insurance company kno w st h ea v e r a g em i l e sd r i v e np e ry e a rb yd r i v e r si n
a given risk pool, it does not (currently) know the miles that given individuals drive. If it charges a per-mile
premium equal to the current yearly premium for the pool divided by the average number of miles driven
by drivers in the pool, it will lose money. Those who drive more miles than the average will leave the pool
for a ﬁrm charging per-year rates and those who drive less miles will stay with this insurance company. The
remaining drivers or adversely selected, because low mileage drivers in any given per-year risk class with37
If monitoring costs are what limit the use of per-mile premiums policies, then to en-
courage their use would seem unwise because lack of use may be a good signal that the
policies’ beneﬁts do not justify their costs. The theory and empirical work here highlights
another reason, though, why such policies are not common, a reason that suggests policy
intervention could be valuable. In particular, the social gains from accident reduction as
a driver reduces her driving could substantially exceed the private gains (realized by the
driver and her insurance carrier), at least in high-traﬃc density states. In New Jersey, for
example, we estimate that the private gains as captured by the linear model are $86 per in-
sured vehicle as compared with social gains of $189-236 once external gains are included (see
Table 3). Hence, most of the beneﬁts from switching to per-mile premiums or some other
premiums schedule that reduces driving are external. The accident externality is surely one
big reason that insurance companies have not made such a switch. If monitoring costs and
other transaction costs lie in the gap between $86 and $189-236, then per-mile premiums
would be eﬃcient in New Jersey, but might not materialize in a free market. Congestion
reductions make the external beneﬁts from per-mile premiums even larger, increasing the
chance of market failure.
Mandating per-mile premiums might be unwise though, even if per-mile premiums are
eﬃcient on average, because monitoring costs are substantial and vary with an individual’s
cost of time. (Heterogeneity across individuals favors policy options that would allow more
individual ﬂexibility.) Even if mandates are not justiﬁed, if driving does cause substantial
external accident costs as the theory and the empirical work here suggest, then some policy
a given accident experience level will tend to be worse drivers than high mileage drivers in the same risk
class. (Long-run historical accident costs divided by miles driven would be a sensible measure of per-mile
risk.) This adverse selection means that the insurance company will have to charge a relatively high per-mile
price to break even given the selection problem and the possibility that high-mileage drivers can choose to
pay ﬁxed annual premiums with other insurance companies. In principle, the insurance company could
probably ﬁnd a suﬃciently high per-mile price that would increase proﬁts. However, one could understand
the hesitancy of a marketing director to propose to his CEO that the insurance company change its pricing
structure in a way that would make its prices less attractive than other insurance companies’ to a large
percentage (probably more than half) of its current customers.38
action could be justiﬁed.
The simplest policy option in states such as Massachusetts that already have regular
checks of automobiles for safety or emissions, would be to record odometer readings at
these checks and transfer this information together with vehicle identiﬁcation numbers to
insurance companies. This would remove the need for special stations for odometer checking,
or for installing special monitoring devices in vehicles. Private monitoring costs would also
be reduced if the government increased sanctions for odometer fraud. Legislation such
as the new Texas Law that legalizes or otherwise fascilitates switching the insurance risk
exposure unit from the vehicle-year to the vehicle-mile can only help.
A second policy option is to impose a tax on premiums suﬃcient to account for the
accident externality of an additional driver. If insurance companies continued to have
a weak mileage-premiums link, people would at least, then, still face eﬃcient incentives
at the margin of whether to become drivers. Moreover, insurance companies would then
have increased incentives to create a strong mileage-premiums link, and drivers would face
second-best incentives at the margin of deciding how many miles to drive. By making
insurers pay the total social accident costs imposed by each of their drivers, a tax would
give insurers the incentive to take all cost-eﬀective measures to reduce this total cost. An
externality tax would align the private incentives to incur monitoring costs and to charge
per-mile premiums with the social incentives, so that insurance companies would switch
premium structures to per-mile or to a schedule that better reﬂects accident cost whenever
monitoring costs and transition costs become low enough to justify the switch. Such a tax
would also make per-mile premiums higher to reﬂect both per-mile claim costs and the tax.
The consequent driving, accident, and delay reductions would likewise be larger, as shown
in the Pigouvian tax portion of Table 5. An alternative to a tax that would be more diﬃcult
to administer, but perhaps easier to legislate, would be a subsidy to insurance companies
that reduce their customers’ driving equal to the resulting external accident cost reductions.39
Another possible policy option is to require insurance companies to oﬀer a choice of per-
mile or per-year premiums (at reasonable rates) as proposed in March 1998 by the National
Organization for Women. A fourth option is to facilitate the formation of an insurance
clearinghouse that allowed individual per-mile premiums to be paid or billed “at the pump"
when gasoline is purchased — again an attempt to lower monitoring costs.
Wisdom demands, however, that enthusiasm for costly policy changes be tempered
until more research is done in this area. Our empirical estimates are only a ﬁrst-cut. Our
regression estimates suﬀer from all the potential biases we suggested and some we did
not. Future research should include covariates and panel data. Our simulation estimates
of the beneﬁts from per-mile premiums and of the Pigouvian tax depend upon the size
of the externality eﬀect, the assumed linear accident/mileage proﬁle for individuals,42 the
responsiveness of driving to price, and our use of insured accident costs. Each of these
areas warrants considerably more examination. For example, if the estimates of the Urban
Institute [1991] are correct, and total accident costs are 3.5 times higher than the insured
costs considered here, then the true beneﬁts of premium restructuring could be much larger
than we have estimated. Finally, we note that it would also be quite informative to break
down externalities by vehicle type.
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Estimates of Insured Accident Cost Function
(Total State Insurance Premiums)
  Calibration Model Regression Model
 (Standard  Error 
in Parentheses)
Miles Coeff. C1 0.007 0.022
(0.002)







State Vehicle Miles  Lane Avg. Cost  Estimated Marginal Cost
Traveled Miles per mile
(billions  (cents) Calibration Method Regression Method
per year) (cents per mile) (cents per mile)
Alabama 51 193,000 2.4 4.3 3.3
Alaska 4 27,000 5.2 8.9 6.6
Arizona 40 117,000 4.4 8.2 6.4
Arkansas 27 156,000 3.0 5.2 3.9
California 276 381,000 4.1 7.8 6.6
Colorado 35 174,000 4.7 8.3 6.2
Connecticut 28 43,000 6.5 12.4 10.4
Delaware 8 12,000 4.9 9.3 7.8
Florida 128 244,000 4.3 8.2 6.7
Georgia 85 233,000 3.1 5.8 4.6
Hawaii 8 8,000 7.9 15.3 13.3
Idaho 12 121,000 2.4 3.9 2.9
Illinois  94 286,000 4.2 7.7 6.0
Indiana 65 191,000 3.0 5.6 4.4
Iowa 26 230,000 3.0 4.9 3.6
Kansas 25 271,000 3.1 5.0 3.7
Kentucky 41 151,000 3.3 6.1 4.6
Louisiana 39 126,000 4.4 8.2 6.3
Maine 13 46,000 3.0 5.5 4.2
Maryland 45 65,000 4.8 9.2 7.8
Massachusetts 48 65,000 6.7 12.9 11.0
Michigan 86 247,000 4.6 8.5 6.7
Minnesota 44 267,000 4.0 6.9 5.1
Mississippi 30 150,000 2.4 4.2 3.2
Missouri 59 250,000 3.0 5.4 4.1
Montana 9 141,000 2.6 4.0 3.0
Nebraska 16 187,000 3.0 4.8 3.5
Nevada 14 92,000 4.9 8.4 6.2
New Hampshire 11 31,000 4.3 8.0 6.3
New Jersey 61 76,000 7.7 14.8 12.7
New Mexico 21 127,000 2.9 5.0 3.7
New  York 115 237,000 6.4 12.0 9.8
North  Carolina 76 202,000 3.5 6.4 5.1
North  Dakota 7 175,000 2.1 2.9 2.3
Ohio 101 241,000 3.6 6.8 5.4
Oklahoma  38 231,000 2.6 4.6 3.4
Oregon 30 171,000 3.8 6.7 5.0
Pennsylvania 95 247,000 5.2 9.7 7.7
Rhode  Island 7 12,000 7.3 13.8 11.4
South  Carolina 39 134,000 3.5 6.5 5.0
South Dakota 8 168,000 2.5 3.6 2.7
Tennessee 56 178,000 2.8 5.1 4.0
Texas 181 626,000 3.2 5.8 4.5
Utah 19 85,000 3.2 5.8 4.3
Vermont 6 29,000 3.2 5.7 4.3
Virginia 70 149,000 3.5 6.5 5.3
Washington 49 164,000 3.9 7.2 5.6
West  Virginia 17 72,000 4.1 7.4 5.6
Wisconsin 51 228,000 3.0 5.3 4.0
Wyoming 7 73,000 1.8 3.0 2.2
National Aggregated
Model 2423 8,158,000 4.0 7.4 5.7Table 3
Accident Savings from Per Mile Premiums
(Net of Lost Driving Benefits)




Linear Model Calibration Model Regression model
total per insured vehicle total per insured vehicle total per insured vehicle
States (dollars in millions) $ (dollars in millions) $ (dollars in millions) $
Alabama 36 14 89 34 63 24
Alaska 13 38 28 83 17 51
Arizona 93 33 223 79 157 56
Arkansas 31 16 70 38 48 26
California 548 34 1391 86 1111 68
Colorado 91 34 207 76 137 50
Connecticut 138 59 328 141 256 109
Delaware 22 43 54 106 44 85
Florida 306 36 752 88 615 72
Georgia 112 21 277 52 224 42
Hawaii 57 81 132 188 105 150
Idaho 81 1 1 8 2 3 1 1 1 4
Illinois  205 27 491 65 365 48
Indiana 75 18 187 45 142 34
Iowa 29 13 63 29 41 19
Kansas 32 15 66 31 44 21
Kentucky 58 21 140 50 102 37
Louisiana 96 39 227 92 167 68
Maine 14 15 34 37 24 26
Maryland 127 38 314 93 255 76
Massachusetts 263 66 622 155 511 128
Michigan 237 33 562 78 442 61
Minnesota 85 26 191 58 126 38
Mississippi 21 15 50 35 34 24
Missouri 69 19 166 45 121 33
Montana 81 1 1 5 2 2 91 3
Nebraska 18 13 36 27 23 17
Nevada 39 39 86 85 54 54
New Hampshire 24 28 59 68 43 50
New Jersey 453 86 1040 198 901 171
New Mexico 21 19 49 44 32 28
New  York 574 60 1339 139 1045 109
North  Carolina 114 19 282 48 211 36
North  Dakota 476 1 3 48
Ohio 165 21 410 52 314 40
Oklahoma  35 15 80 34 56 24
Oregon 52 22 118 51 74 32
Pennsylvania 317 38 749 90 565 68
Rhode  Island 44 68 101 157 80 124
South  Carolina 63 23 151 56 113 42
South Dakota 61 0 1 0 1 8 71 2
Tennessee 55 16 136 39 99 28
Texas 230 24 559 59 409 43
Utah 23 18 55 43 36 28
Vermont 81 7 1 8 4 1 1 3 2 8
Virginia 105 21 264 54 206 42
Washington 90 27 216 64 148 44
West  Virginia 37 29 86 68 61 48
Wisconsin 56 15 134 37 91 25
Wyoming 386 1 6 4 1 0
U.S. Total 
(disaggregated sum) 5310 31 12686 75 9762 58
National Aggregated
Model 4954 29 11813 70 8476 50Accident Savings from Per-Mile Premiums with Pigouvian tax
(Net of Lost Driving Benefits)




Linear Model Calibration Model Regression model
total per insured vehicle total per insured vehicle total per insured vehicle
States (dollars in millions) $ (dollars in millions) $ (dollars in millions) $
Alabama 36 14 109 42 67 26
Alaska 13 38 32 96 19 58
Arizona 93 33 269 95 178 63
Arkansas 31 16 83 45 49 26
California 548 34 1719 106 1305 80
Colorado 91 34 244 90 150 55
Connecticut 138 59 396 170 301 129
Delaware 22 43 66 129 49 96
Florida 306 36 918 108 659 78
Georgia 112 21 338 64 223 42
Hawaii 57 81 159 226 129 183
Idaho 81 1 2 1 2 7 1 2 1 5
Illinois  205 27 593 79 390 52
Indiana 75 18 228 55 148 36
Iowa 29 13 72 33 42 19
Kansas 32 15 75 35 43 20
Kentucky 58 21 169 61 106 38
Louisiana 96 39 272 110 177 72
Maine 14 15 42 45 26 28
Maryland 127 38 384 114 292 87
Massachusetts 263 66 749 187 585 146
Michigan 237 33 676 94 452 63
Minnesota 85 26 224 68 133 41
Mississippi 21 15 61 42 36 24
Missouri 69 19 199 54 122 33
Montana 81 1 1 6 2 5 1 0 1 5
Nebraska 18 13 41 30 24 18
Nevada 39 39 100 99 60 59
New Hampshire 24 28 71 82 47 54
New Jersey 453 86 1241 236 991 189
New Mexico 21 19 58 52 34 30
New  York 574 60 1604 167 1162 121
North  Carolina 114 19 344 59 229 39
North  Dakota 476 1 4 49
Ohio 165 21 501 63 341 43
Oklahoma  35 15 95 40 55 23
Oregon 52 22 139 60 83 36
Pennsylvania 317 38 900 108 616 74
Rhode  Island 44 68 121 188 90 140
South  Carolina 63 23 182 67 116 43
South Dakota 61 0 1 1 2 0 71 2
Tennessee 55 16 166 47 106 30
Texas 230 24 678 72 429 45
Utah 23 18 66 52 40 31
Vermont 81 7 2 2 4 9 1 3 2 9
Virginia 105 21 325 66 226 46
Washington 90 27 261 77 168 50
West  Virginia 37 29 103 81 64 50
Wisconsin 56 15 161 44 97 27
Wyoming 387 1 9 4 1 0
U.S. Total 
(disaggregated sum) 5310 31 15319 91 10707 63
National Aggregated
Model 4936 29 14174 84 9131 54
Table 4Table 5
U. S. Benefits from Other Premium Schedules
Linear Model  Calibration Model Regression Model
Per-Mile Premiums
Net Accident Savings
U.S. Total (billions of dollars) 5.3 12.7 9.8
Per Insured Vehicle (dollars) 31.4 75.0 57.7
Reduced Delay Costs (external)
U.S. Total (billions of dollars) 6.0 5.5 5.7
Per Insured Vehicle (dollars) 35.6 32.5 33.8
Total Benefits
U.S. Total (billions of dollars) 11.3 18.2 15.5
Per Insured Vehicle (dollars) 67.0 107.5 91.5
 with Pigouvian tax
Net Accident Savings
U.S. Total (billions of dollars) 5.3 15.3 10.7
Per Insured Vehicle (dollars) 31.4 90.6 63.3
Reduced Delay Costs (external)
U.S. Total (billions of dollars) 6.0 9.4 8.0
Per Insured Vehicle (dollars) 35.6 55.6 47.5
Total Benefits
U.S. Total (billions of dollars) 11.3 24.7 18.7
Per Insured Vehicle (dollars) 67.0 146.2 110.8